I missed my high school reunion last weekend. That I had one is only mildly surprising as I found out about it through slightly indirect means, but that’s admittedly esoteric. That I missed it should be not at all surprising since I live at least three flights away now (Port Gentil - Libreville - Paris - SFO) and am not currently in a position to be away from work since we’re transitioning over here and it’s important I be generally awesome or something like that.
It would have been nice to go back and see people, although any trip back to the Bay Area would be generally great since I would be in the Bay Area, which the newscast calls “the best place on earth” and they seem like impartial folks. The reunion itself would have been fun. It also would not have been as interesting without this internet thing, facebook, various chat programs, e-mail, and all our other modern splendors. Let’s face it. You’re still in touch with most of the people you want to be in touch with. And you’re semi-in touch with everyone else through the magic of friends of friends on facebook. Who knew that people married high school sweethearts? Well, we all basically knew. The only people you’re not in touch with at all are those who dropped off the face of the earth because they wanted to get away, hated everyone (or maybe only me), or thought Jason Bourne was a good role model. Or they are the ones who you always had a crush on, but never said anything about and now regret not doing anything, but are too afraid to try and get in touch with them because it will ruin the impossibly good image of that person that you have built up in your mind. Um, yeah. It could be that, though it would likely make for an awkward encounter if you ever ran into said object of affection.
Anywho, we’re in touch. Aggravatingly in touch? No, since it’s easy to go semi-off grid like me and generally ignore friend requests into oblivion. But this in-touch-ness is rendering reunions less interesting and consequently seems like a possible reason why attendance was not that high. For our class (and possibly all the classes from my school), I would venture to guess post-graduation mobility is also quite high compared to some sort of national average. Furthermore, I know many people who are still in school, either pursuing PhDs or they worked a few years and are off to earn MBAs now. Sure it’s summer (in the northern hemisphere), but people are away from the Bay.
I’ll be back one day. Maybe another 10 years from now. Or sooner. But in 10 years it’ll be more interesting to see how far afield everyone has gone.
Monday, June 28, 2010
Sunday, June 27, 2010
flopping and officiating
The flopping and faking of injuries in soccer is a disgrace to the sport. It makes me cringe any time a player goes down clutching his angle, shin, knee, face (you know who you are Keita), etc and rolling around on the ground like someone in a stop, drop and roll instructional video. I played soccer for many years up into high school for school and club teams. We played hard, sometimes aggressively, and yes, people ran into each other, fouls were committed, and general contact occurred. But I never saw a teammate or opponent go down in apparent pain who was not actually hurt and did not need to be substituted for. (Cramps and getting the wind knocked out are other matters, but I’ve never seen anyone use those as a ploy for slowing down the game or drawing a free kick). This is why it pains me to see these professional athletes, some of whom have been made wealthy and famous by their sport, disgrace that same sport with such contemptible behavior. Put more simply, it is cheating.
Unfortunately, it will never end as long as there is no real consequence for the actions. I was pleased a few World Cups back when they started to dole out yellow cards for blatantly fake falls and play acting. However, many plays are still missed and much over-acting of actual fouls occurs in an attempt to induce a yellow or even red card instead of a simple free kick. Much like the need for some instant replay to improve the quality of the officiating, post-game reviews of penalties, both real and imagined is necessary. This review must come with consequences that includes suspension from international play, league play, and fines (as a function of player pay as players make highly variable pay). This is the only way it will have teeth and, if not stop, at least strongly curtail the flopping, because if I wanted to watch that, I’d be watching the fishing championship on the Outdoors channel. Regrettably, much like drug-testing in baseball, financial reform on Wall Street, and energy policy legislation, if it ever happens, it will be weak and ineffectual.
Perhaps the biggest hindrance to improved officiating in soccer is FIFA President Sepp Blatter, who has taken the stance of a luddite when it comes to using technology to improve the games. He has been critical of the use of replay or other means to assess when goals are scored because “the game must be played the same way no matter where you are in the world.” Excuse me? "Men, women, children, amateurs and professionals all play the same game all over the world.” No they don’t. If you think those kids playing on that dirt pitch over there is the same thing as professionals on a sod field with professional horticulturists looking after the grass, then you’re a moron at best, and a disingenuous liar at worst. Sometimes you play with just one linesman, sometimes none, sometimes two, who knows. But let’s not avoid the use of technology to improve the fairness of the sport at its highest level while hiding behind some “think of the children” mantra. Tennis has successfully brought technology into their officiating at high levels and it has not ruined the amateur and developmental levels of the sport. Soccer could do likewise, if only a bloated relic of the past wasn’t dragging it down.
Unfortunately, it will never end as long as there is no real consequence for the actions. I was pleased a few World Cups back when they started to dole out yellow cards for blatantly fake falls and play acting. However, many plays are still missed and much over-acting of actual fouls occurs in an attempt to induce a yellow or even red card instead of a simple free kick. Much like the need for some instant replay to improve the quality of the officiating, post-game reviews of penalties, both real and imagined is necessary. This review must come with consequences that includes suspension from international play, league play, and fines (as a function of player pay as players make highly variable pay). This is the only way it will have teeth and, if not stop, at least strongly curtail the flopping, because if I wanted to watch that, I’d be watching the fishing championship on the Outdoors channel. Regrettably, much like drug-testing in baseball, financial reform on Wall Street, and energy policy legislation, if it ever happens, it will be weak and ineffectual.
Perhaps the biggest hindrance to improved officiating in soccer is FIFA President Sepp Blatter, who has taken the stance of a luddite when it comes to using technology to improve the games. He has been critical of the use of replay or other means to assess when goals are scored because “the game must be played the same way no matter where you are in the world.” Excuse me? "Men, women, children, amateurs and professionals all play the same game all over the world.” No they don’t. If you think those kids playing on that dirt pitch over there is the same thing as professionals on a sod field with professional horticulturists looking after the grass, then you’re a moron at best, and a disingenuous liar at worst. Sometimes you play with just one linesman, sometimes none, sometimes two, who knows. But let’s not avoid the use of technology to improve the fairness of the sport at its highest level while hiding behind some “think of the children” mantra. Tennis has successfully brought technology into their officiating at high levels and it has not ruined the amateur and developmental levels of the sport. Soccer could do likewise, if only a bloated relic of the past wasn’t dragging it down.
Friday, June 25, 2010
group H
In World Cup Group H, it's interesting to see how the standings are going into the final games of the round-robin group stage. We could end up in a situation where Chile, Spain, and Switzerland are all 2-1 with Hondurus taking the 0-3 drubbing. Or, we could up with Spain at 3-0 with Hondurus, Spain, and Switzerland each at 1-2. Tie-breakers are great.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
housing still weak
I started a post back in December about how the housing market was still weak. To be clear, it is still weak. It is moderately local, but the overall US housing market is garbage. As always, my main man Ritholtz at The Big Picture cuts through the flim flam with his explanation of why there will be a second leg down in housing. Basically, unemployment is still high, real wages have staganted for a decade, inventory is high, and price-to-rent ratios are still high. Further context for a drop in new home sales and I recommend checking out the first few comments from this blurb on a debate on the state of the housing market.
For those of you in the Bay Area, you all know that market works in an alternate universe than everywhere else. However, a word for some of the married and/or soon-to-be-married young folks I know might be in the market for a domicile in the next 24 months is to be judicious. The market may rebound sooner (and has partially rebounded off the bottom), but keep an eye out for deals and taking advantage of what is fundamentally a buyers market. Have fun.
For those of you in the Bay Area, you all know that market works in an alternate universe than everywhere else. However, a word for some of the married and/or soon-to-be-married young folks I know might be in the market for a domicile in the next 24 months is to be judicious. The market may rebound sooner (and has partially rebounded off the bottom), but keep an eye out for deals and taking advantage of what is fundamentally a buyers market. Have fun.
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
briefly on safety
Industrial safety is a tricky thing. I won't deny that corporate abuses have taken place in the past and still take place in some (probably most) parts of the world today. However, even in places that have rigorous safety programs and are building a safety-conscious culture, injuries will still occur. I have learned that people will always find new and surprisingly inventive ways to hurt themselves. And while this has perhaps been said by someone before, I'll go with Scott Adams on this:
"There's nothing more dangerous than a resourceful idiot."
"There's nothing more dangerous than a resourceful idiot."
Monday, June 21, 2010
port gentil, gabon
Transferred to Port Gentil, Gabon. Already here. It's the next country north from Congo. That is all.
deepwater decisions
It should hardly come as a surprise that a great many e-mails circulate around the interwebs regarding the Deepwater Horizon and the circumstances leading up the explosion. I recently received something that I assume is public record and that would be the letter from Congressmen Waxman and Stupak to BP CEO Tony Hayward dated June 14, 2010. If you want a copy, let me know.
Before I get into the letter, along with many legitimate articles and investigation pieces, there is a great deal of false information running around. Some of it takes the form of sloppy reporting and some takes the form of nonsensical rumor-mongering. (To be clear, the claim that SLB paid for a private helicopter to fly personnel off of Deepwater Horizon is incorrect). Ah internet, you will always be strange and mystical things to people who do not know much. That misinformation can spread so pervasively is the reality of the world, but it is hardly a new phenomenon, just a much faster phenomenon now.
The letter from Congressmen Waxman and Stupak addresses five key points:
1) The decision to use a well design with few barriers to gas flow
2) The failure to use a sufficient number of “centralizers” to prevent channeling during the cement process
3) The failure to run a cement bond log to evaluate the effectiveness of the cement job
4) The failure to circulate potentially gas-bearing drilling muds out of the well
5) The failure to secure the wellhead with a lockdown sleeve before allowing pressure on the seal from below
As I have written before, I do not have special or “inside” knowledge of Deepwater Horizon and the events surround the explosion of the rig. I only have my own experience and I most definitely do not represent an official opinion. I am simply slightly better informed than the general public on the matter.
I want to deconstruct the five points in the letter. I am not trying to suggest that mistakes were not made or that best practices were followed. I merely want to provide an explanation of why some of the decisions may have been made and give some more context. It is clear from the general media and reporting that the decisions are generally being portrayed as beyond reckless and driven by financial considerations. Well, yes. This is a business. Almost all decisions are driven by financial considerations, and even seemingly ethical or ‘soft’ factors can be given a price. However, I don’t want to go down that path of what a human life is worth right now. I just want to note that businesses are in the business of staying in business. Yes? But that does not mean BP did not weigh considerations beyond the most basic ones being seen on the surface.
Point 1 on using a design with few barriers is a reference to run a single string of casing (which was actually in two different sizes but that’s not important) instead of a liner. The single string of casing is a reference to the metal pipe used in the well. Casing (or liners) are run into a newly drilled section of the hole and then usually cemented in place. The cement isolates the various formations (which contain oil, gas, water, etc) from each other and also keeps the casing/liner in place. A single-string refers to having casing in one continuous length that runs from the bottom of the well all the way to the sea floor. A liner would only run from the bottom of the well to somewhere inside the previous casing/liner. On a final section like this one, a tieback section of casing would later be run from the top of the liner to the sea floor and that would also be cemented in place. The liner and subsequent tieback would take significantly more time to run than a single string of casing mostly owing to the time it would take to set the liner, wait on cement, run the tieback, cement the tieback, and wait on cement again. However, a liner carries with it additional operational risks. There is an increased risk of placing little to no cement in the open-hole annulus at all. This is due to possible failures that can occur at the top of the liner where darts and plugs (used to wipe the inside of the pipe and separate fluids that are pumped) can get stuck in the liner top assembly. This is not necessarily a high risk, but I have seen some operators express enough concern that they do not run darts and plugs, but instead another method of pipe-wiping and fluid separation that is generally less effective and carries its own set of risks. What is the risk of a liner failure where (almost) all your cement ends up inside the liner instead of on the outside? Generally, it’s a disaster since there is no isolation of the annulus and now you cannot even circulate the well.
Point 2 discusses centralizers. As their name implies, the centralizers are used to keep the liner centered in the hole. Without them, the liner will tend to lay against the “low” side of the hole. Even in a vertical well this will still occur (and there is also no such thing as a perfectly vertical well). When the liner is against one side of the well (or even if it is sufficiently out-of-center without touching the side), there will be little to no fluid flow on that narrow side. The mud, spacers, and cement slurries will all take the path of least resistance which is on the wide side. Once again, this could result in inadequate cement coverage and a lack of isolation. This makes it seem like we should be running a lot of centralizers all the time, yes? (A lot of centralizers could be about 1-2 centralizers per joint of casing/liner where a joint is usually about 40-45 ft long.) No. Centralizers work because they act like springs on the side of the casing/liner pushing it off the walls of the open hole. When running the casing into the well, centralizers create a drag force and lots of centralizers means lots of drag force. This will make it more difficult to get the casing to the bottom of the well and increases the chance the pipe will get stuck before it is at the bottom. Based on what I have read, HAL proposed 21 centralizers which seems like it would be a bit less than 1 per joint of casing/liner in the open hole. This is probably very reasonable for a well that was planned to be vertical. BP chose to run six centralizers out of concern for time (which equals money) but also at least expressed a concern about getting stuck. (As an aside that is probably worth a post on its own, getting operators to run enough centralizers is one of the more difficult things to convince a client to do. It is an example of the nature of the relationship between the operators and service companies).
Point 3 discusses the evaluation, or lack thereof, of the cement job. Ok, I’ll admit to not knowing why they would not run some sort of log to at least determine top of cement, but preferably a proper evaluation of the job. At this point, cost considerations are probably the most prominent factor in the decision.
Point 4 is on the lack of circulation prior to cementing operations. Circulation is important to both evaluate the mud and ensure it is not coming back with gas in it and also to cool the well as cementing is done with prejob tests at specific temperatures that generally assume a particular amount of circulation. For a well that is experiencing losses that cannot be easily stopped, operators will sometimes not fully circulate the well with one hole volume or a “bottoms up” as it’s often called. This is because losses consume mud and circulating usually increase the rate of loss. If losses are severe enough, it can make it difficult to maintain sufficient mud volume (which needs to be constantly made up at the rig) to both circulate the well and keep adequate emergency reserve if well control problems do occur. As a consequence, cementing operations sometimes occur when the well has not been fully circulated. (Cementing a well that is experiencing losses carries with it many risks, but sometimes it remains the “best” option instead of spending more time trying to stop losses.)
Point 5 is on the lockdown sleeve and I am not really familiar with this device. I will instead cheat and speak generally about hardware and tools and how much stuff gets put into a well. The more complicated something is, the more likely it is to fail. What are the risks of a sleeve? Maybe it sets at the wrong time or place. Perhaps it creates an additional flow restriction which would make loss problems more difficult to deal with. I don’t know and I’m not going to get worked up over it.
I want to drive home that problems are rarely simple black and white choices. In this business, many factors go into decisions and selection processes. This is what we need to remember when examining why failures occur and how complex decisions get made.
Before I get into the letter, along with many legitimate articles and investigation pieces, there is a great deal of false information running around. Some of it takes the form of sloppy reporting and some takes the form of nonsensical rumor-mongering. (To be clear, the claim that SLB paid for a private helicopter to fly personnel off of Deepwater Horizon is incorrect). Ah internet, you will always be strange and mystical things to people who do not know much. That misinformation can spread so pervasively is the reality of the world, but it is hardly a new phenomenon, just a much faster phenomenon now.
The letter from Congressmen Waxman and Stupak addresses five key points:
1) The decision to use a well design with few barriers to gas flow
2) The failure to use a sufficient number of “centralizers” to prevent channeling during the cement process
3) The failure to run a cement bond log to evaluate the effectiveness of the cement job
4) The failure to circulate potentially gas-bearing drilling muds out of the well
5) The failure to secure the wellhead with a lockdown sleeve before allowing pressure on the seal from below
As I have written before, I do not have special or “inside” knowledge of Deepwater Horizon and the events surround the explosion of the rig. I only have my own experience and I most definitely do not represent an official opinion. I am simply slightly better informed than the general public on the matter.
I want to deconstruct the five points in the letter. I am not trying to suggest that mistakes were not made or that best practices were followed. I merely want to provide an explanation of why some of the decisions may have been made and give some more context. It is clear from the general media and reporting that the decisions are generally being portrayed as beyond reckless and driven by financial considerations. Well, yes. This is a business. Almost all decisions are driven by financial considerations, and even seemingly ethical or ‘soft’ factors can be given a price. However, I don’t want to go down that path of what a human life is worth right now. I just want to note that businesses are in the business of staying in business. Yes? But that does not mean BP did not weigh considerations beyond the most basic ones being seen on the surface.
Point 1 on using a design with few barriers is a reference to run a single string of casing (which was actually in two different sizes but that’s not important) instead of a liner. The single string of casing is a reference to the metal pipe used in the well. Casing (or liners) are run into a newly drilled section of the hole and then usually cemented in place. The cement isolates the various formations (which contain oil, gas, water, etc) from each other and also keeps the casing/liner in place. A single-string refers to having casing in one continuous length that runs from the bottom of the well all the way to the sea floor. A liner would only run from the bottom of the well to somewhere inside the previous casing/liner. On a final section like this one, a tieback section of casing would later be run from the top of the liner to the sea floor and that would also be cemented in place. The liner and subsequent tieback would take significantly more time to run than a single string of casing mostly owing to the time it would take to set the liner, wait on cement, run the tieback, cement the tieback, and wait on cement again. However, a liner carries with it additional operational risks. There is an increased risk of placing little to no cement in the open-hole annulus at all. This is due to possible failures that can occur at the top of the liner where darts and plugs (used to wipe the inside of the pipe and separate fluids that are pumped) can get stuck in the liner top assembly. This is not necessarily a high risk, but I have seen some operators express enough concern that they do not run darts and plugs, but instead another method of pipe-wiping and fluid separation that is generally less effective and carries its own set of risks. What is the risk of a liner failure where (almost) all your cement ends up inside the liner instead of on the outside? Generally, it’s a disaster since there is no isolation of the annulus and now you cannot even circulate the well.
Point 2 discusses centralizers. As their name implies, the centralizers are used to keep the liner centered in the hole. Without them, the liner will tend to lay against the “low” side of the hole. Even in a vertical well this will still occur (and there is also no such thing as a perfectly vertical well). When the liner is against one side of the well (or even if it is sufficiently out-of-center without touching the side), there will be little to no fluid flow on that narrow side. The mud, spacers, and cement slurries will all take the path of least resistance which is on the wide side. Once again, this could result in inadequate cement coverage and a lack of isolation. This makes it seem like we should be running a lot of centralizers all the time, yes? (A lot of centralizers could be about 1-2 centralizers per joint of casing/liner where a joint is usually about 40-45 ft long.) No. Centralizers work because they act like springs on the side of the casing/liner pushing it off the walls of the open hole. When running the casing into the well, centralizers create a drag force and lots of centralizers means lots of drag force. This will make it more difficult to get the casing to the bottom of the well and increases the chance the pipe will get stuck before it is at the bottom. Based on what I have read, HAL proposed 21 centralizers which seems like it would be a bit less than 1 per joint of casing/liner in the open hole. This is probably very reasonable for a well that was planned to be vertical. BP chose to run six centralizers out of concern for time (which equals money) but also at least expressed a concern about getting stuck. (As an aside that is probably worth a post on its own, getting operators to run enough centralizers is one of the more difficult things to convince a client to do. It is an example of the nature of the relationship between the operators and service companies).
Point 3 discusses the evaluation, or lack thereof, of the cement job. Ok, I’ll admit to not knowing why they would not run some sort of log to at least determine top of cement, but preferably a proper evaluation of the job. At this point, cost considerations are probably the most prominent factor in the decision.
Point 4 is on the lack of circulation prior to cementing operations. Circulation is important to both evaluate the mud and ensure it is not coming back with gas in it and also to cool the well as cementing is done with prejob tests at specific temperatures that generally assume a particular amount of circulation. For a well that is experiencing losses that cannot be easily stopped, operators will sometimes not fully circulate the well with one hole volume or a “bottoms up” as it’s often called. This is because losses consume mud and circulating usually increase the rate of loss. If losses are severe enough, it can make it difficult to maintain sufficient mud volume (which needs to be constantly made up at the rig) to both circulate the well and keep adequate emergency reserve if well control problems do occur. As a consequence, cementing operations sometimes occur when the well has not been fully circulated. (Cementing a well that is experiencing losses carries with it many risks, but sometimes it remains the “best” option instead of spending more time trying to stop losses.)
Point 5 is on the lockdown sleeve and I am not really familiar with this device. I will instead cheat and speak generally about hardware and tools and how much stuff gets put into a well. The more complicated something is, the more likely it is to fail. What are the risks of a sleeve? Maybe it sets at the wrong time or place. Perhaps it creates an additional flow restriction which would make loss problems more difficult to deal with. I don’t know and I’m not going to get worked up over it.
I want to drive home that problems are rarely simple black and white choices. In this business, many factors go into decisions and selection processes. This is what we need to remember when examining why failures occur and how complex decisions get made.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)